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Abstract 
All US commercial airports are in the public sector yet not all have the same ownership 
type. For medium and large hub US airports we use stochastic frontier analysis to analyze the 
efficiency differences for alternative airport ownership types. We find that while form of 
ownership may matter for cost efficiency, in general its effect is relatively small. Yet type of public 
sector ownership does have cost efficiency implications in certain environments. Further, when 
heterogeneity is not controlled, the results change substantially so that type of ownership matters 
much more which demonstrates the importance of controlling for cross section heterogeneity. 
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I. Introduction  
An April 1, 2014 headline in the NY Times stated: “Report Traces Port Authority’s Flaws 
to a Crumbling Business Model”, referring to the lane closures on the George Washington Bridge 
in 2013. The George Washington Bridge is one of six bridges and tunnels managed by the Port 
Authority of New York and New Jersey (PANYNJ), a joint venture between New York and New 
Jersey that also manages the region’s seaports, five airports (including JFK International and 
LaGuardia (New York) and New Jersey’s Newark Liberty airports), and the trans-Hudson rapid 
rail system (PATH). Of relevance to this paper is that PANYNJ is one of several types of 
ownership for commercial airports in the US, all of which are in the public sector. Airport or port 
authorities (as PANYNJ) own and operate some airports while cities, states, and counties own and 
govern others. And while there have been a number of studies on the economic efficiency of 
private versus public sector airports, there have been relatively few studies that focus explicitly on 
the efficiency of alternative forms of public sector ownership associated with US commercial 
airports. Are port authorities such as PANYNJ, for example, less efficient as suggested by the 
article’s title or do port authorities embody a level of expertise that enhance cost efficiencies?  
This paper reports the results of a stochastic frontier cost model on a panel (1996-2008) of 
twenty-four medium and twenty-six large hub commercial airports in the US. The analysis 
contributes to the literature in three specific ways: we analyze the relative efficiency differences 
across four US commercial airport ownership types (city, county, state, airport authority); we 
distinguish airport specific heterogeneity due to cost efficiency and, separately, to factors other 
than efficiency; and we perform a series of counterfactual analyses to analyze the efficiency effects 
of local ownership, hub size, and multiple airport metropolitan areas. 
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Based on a single output scenario, where the output is number of departures, our main 
findings are summarized as follows. First, conditioning on medium hub airports in multi-airport 
cities, airports owned by city or airport/port authorities have 9.59% (at median) higher variable 
costs due to cost inefficiency compared to county or state-owned airports. Second, among the 
medium hub airports owned by the city or airport/port authorities, those in multiple-airport cities 
have 8.6% (at median) higher variable costs relative to those in single-airport cities.1 Third, there 
is not much effect on cost efficiency between medium and large hubs.  
Inspired by Hicks’ (1935) quiet life hypothesis, we examined the effect of multiple airports 
in a metropolitan area.2 For the sample of airports, we find that the median cost efficiency for 
single-airport and multi-airport cities is 88.2% and 86.9%, respectively, a negligible efficiency 
difference.3 In general, when we control for airport specific heterogeneity, the median cost 
efficiency for the whole sample is 87.6%, which is not very sensitive to ownership type. In sum, 
it seems that while the form of ownership may not have much effect on cost efficiency individually, 
their combination may alter cost efficiency levels. The average variable cost differences mostly 
stem from differences in scale economies for different ownership types. The outcome dramatically 
changes, however, when we do not control for airport specific heterogeneity. For example, the 
median cost efficiency for airports with and without local (i.e. city or airport authority) ownership 
is 80% and 92.6%, respectively. The difference is more dramatic for large and medium hubs 
(47.3% and 99.5%, respectively). It appears that when not controlling for heterogeneity, the 
                                                     
1 Cost efficiency is used in the standard stochastic frontier literature language. That is, it is the ratio of the frontier 
minimum cost to observed cost. A potential reason for such deviation is the principle agent problem that the objectives 
of administrators may not fully align with cost minimization. Another reason may be optimization mistakes that are 
done by the decision makers. 
2 Quiet life hypothesis claims that, holding other factors constant, higher competition increases cost efficiency.  
3 Note that efficiency is a relative concept. That is, the efficiency estimates are based on comparison to the best 
practice. However, since the efficiency is captured by a random component the highest efficiency estimate is not 
necessarily equals to 100%. When the number of observations is large it may be reasonable to assume that the best 
practice firm is on the frontier.  
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intrinsic characteristics of the airports that are not captured by the existing control variables may 
be misinterpreted as inefficiency/efficiency in costs.  
 
II. Relevant Literature  
Arbrate and Erbetta (2010) and Voltes-Dorta and Lei (2013) provide excellent summaries 
of the increasing body of research on airport costs, efficiency, productivity, and type of ownership. 
Although similar to the literature cited in these studies, Table 1 complements these literature 
reviews in focusing on airport ownership and identifying specific results that relate to alternative 
ownership types. In general, the bulk of the research reported in Table 1, particularly more recent 
research, indicates that private ownership is more efficient than public ownership. However, this 
is a broad generalization and the reported studies also indicate that the effect of ownership depends 
on a number of factors related to the competitive environment.  
In the late 1990s and early 2000 period, Vasigh and Haririan (2003), Parker (1999), and 
Oum, Yu, and Fu (2003) find little effect of privatization on airport operations. Oum, Yu, and Fu 
(2003) also notes the importance of managerial autonomy in airport efficiency and Vasigh and 
Haririan (2003) finds that private ownership produced better financial results. Oum, Adler, and Yu 
(2006) and Oum, Yan, and Yu (2008) find that privatized airports are more efficient than public 
sector airports but public sector airports are more efficient than airports with a public-private 
structure. Consistent with this, Botasso, Conti, and Piga (2012) finds no productivity effect 
associated with mixed ownership forms. Related to these studies, Martin, Roman, and Voltes-
Dorta (2009) and Martin and Voltes-Dorta (2011) find that multi-airport systems have higher unit 
costs because they operate under the presence of non-exhausted scale economies.  
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Table 1 
Airport Ownership Literature 
 
 
Author(s) Method Data sample Governance Results
Adler, N., Liebert, V. 
(2014)
DEA 48 German/UK airports, 
3 Ausralian airports, 
1998-2007
Regardless of ownership form, regulation is necessary to generate 
competitive forces and mixed ownership is less efficienct regardless of 
level of competition.
Vasigh, Erfani, and 
Sherman (2014)
TFP 6 UK, 11 Latin 
American, 7 US 
airports, 2000-2010
US public ownership airports more efficient than UK's privatized and 
Latin America's partially-privatized airports. Market 
structure/competition may be more important than ownership structure.  
Zhao, Q., Choo, Y., and
Oum, T. (2014)
SFA Panel, 54 US and 
Canadian airports, 2002 - 
2008
Airport authorities are 14% more cost efficient and have lower labor 
shares.
Martin, J., Rodríguez-
Déniz, H., and Voltes-
Dorta, A. (2013)
SFA (SR) Panel, 194 airports 
worldwide, 2007-2009
Higher share of LCC increases cost flexibility; airline dominance 
increases (decreases) flexibility in US (Europe); Corporatization 
(outsourcing) enhances (reduces) cost flexibility. 
Assaf, A. and Gillen, 
D.(2012)
TL-BYS SFA Panel, 73 airports 2003-
2008 (Europe, NA, 
Australia)
Price regulation more important than type of ownership. Regulated firm 
becoming a private competitor with no regulation yield largest gains. 
Assaf, A., Gillen, D. and 
Barros, C. (2012)
TL-BYS SFA Panel, 27 airports 
1998–2008
Results consistent with idea that a deregulated airline sector combined 
with a privatized airport sector precludes the need for regulation.
Barbot, C. (2011) Theory N/A Negotiated airport use between the leading airline and the airport (EU 
case)/long term terminal leases (Australian case) are anti-competitive.  
Contracts with ‘majority in interest’ clauses with signatory airlines 
(‘US’ case) do not preclude other airlines in the downstream market.
Bottasso,  A., Conti, M. 
and Piga, C. (2012)
CD Panel, 24 UK airports 
2002–2005
LCCs positively affect TFP. Private/public airport governance structure 
had no impact on TFP relative to a mixed ownership airport.  
Bottasso, A. and Conti, 
M. (2012)
TL Panel, 25 UK airports 
1994–2005
Relative to public/mixed ownership, private ownership has lower costs 
but cost advantage fell over time airport competition increased.
Craig, S., Airola, J. and 
Tipu, M. (2012)
SGM Panel, 52 US airports, 
1979-1992
Airport authorities technically 40% more efficient than city governance 
but rent dissipation redcues this to a 5% overall cost advantage.
Martín, J. and Voltes-
Dorta, A. (2011)
TL (LR) Panel, 161 airports 
worldwide, 1991 - 2008
Unexhausted IRS which implies lower cost efficiency for multi-airport 
systems relative to individual airports. 
Martin, J., Roman, C., 
R., and Voltes-Dorta, 
A. (2009)
TL SFA (LR, 
SR)
Panel, 37 Spanish 
airports, 1991-1997
IRS and technological progress imlies higher unit costs for multi-airport 
systems.  
Fuhr, J., Beckers, 
T.(2009)
TCE Case Studies: BOS, 
JFK, PDX, DTW
Contractual/financing agreements reduce public ownership inefficiency 
in the US. Revenue bonds/airline agreements enhance efficiency. 
Barros, C. and Dieke, 
P.  (2008)
DEA Panel, 31 Italian 
airports, 2001-2003
Partially privatized airports contribute to efficiency.
Martín, J. and Voltes-
Dorta, A. (2008)
TL Unbalanced panel, 41 
worldwide 1991–2005
Unexhausted IRS implying less cost efficiency at multi-airport systems.
Oum, T., Yan, J., and 
Yu, C. (2008)
TL (SR) Unbalanced panel, 109 
worldwide 2001–2004
Privatization enhances efficiency but 100% government ownership is 
preferred to mixed ownership. More than 90% probability that city/state 
airports more efficient than those owned/operated by airport authorities
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Table 1 
Airport Ownership Literature (cont’d) 
_____________________________________________________________________________________ 
* See Appendix I for definition of acronyms. 
.  
 
The general result that privatization enhances efficiency relative to public sector ownership 
is a ‘proof of concept’ result, consistent with economic theory. In order to better understand the 
relationship between types of airport ownership and efficiency, there is a growing body of research 
that is looking at underlying characteristics of specific types of airport ownership. Two avenues of 
research focus on regulation and airport use agreements. 
Assaf, Gillen, and Barros (2012) finds that airline deregulation (i.e. a competitive airline 
sector) combined with a competitive airport sector precludes the need for airport regulation. 
Consistent with this, Assaf and Gillen (2012) finds that price regulation is more important than 
airport ownership per se. Adler and Liebert (2014) also highlights the importance of a competition 
and finds that regulation, regardless of ownership type, is necessary to ensure a competitive 
environment. And Vasigh, Erfani, and Sherman (2014) argues that market structure and 
Author(s) Method Data sample Governance Results
Fuhr, J., Beckers, T. TCE Case Study: Frankfort, Private contractual arrangements such as specialized governance 
Oum, T. Adler, N., and 
Yu, C. (2006)
VFP 116 Asia-Pacific, NA, 
European airpots, 2001-
2003
Government majority/multi-level ownership is less efficient than private 
majority. 100% public ownership more efficent than PPP with 
government majority.
Vasigh, B., Gorjidooz, J. 
(2006)
TFP Panel, 22 airports (US, 
UK, EU), 2000-2004
Operators of more airports have higher TFP. Productivity effects of 
ownership and management depends on the competitive environment. 
Oum, T., Yu, C., Fu, X. 
(2003)
OLS 52 World, 99 Ownership structure is not an important determinant, consistent with 
managerial autonomy having a critical role. 
Vasigh, B., Haririan, M. 
(2003)
OLS 7 BAA airports, 8 US 
airports
Government airports have better operating efficiency and privatized 
airports have better financial efficiency.
Parker (1999) DEA Panel, BAA. 1979/80 - 
1995/96
Privatization had no noticeable impact on technical efficiency
Vasigh, B., Hamzaee, 
R. (1998)
OLS Panel, 93 US hub 
airports, 1985/86 - 
1995/96
Airport use agreements are an important for airport profits and capacity 
utilization. Compensatory airport use agreements add most to 
profitability.
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competition may be more relevant for productivity and efficiency compared with ownership 
structure.  
In a theoretical paper on airport use agreements, Barbot (2011) explores the predominant 
types of use agreements, finding that negotiated agreements with the leading airline and long term 
leases are anti-competitive whereas majority in interest agreements with signatory airlines are 
relatively more competitive. Arguably, these results are consistent with Martin, Rodriguez-Deniz, 
and Voltes-Dorta (2013) that find airline dominance to increase cost flexibility in the US but 
decrease cost flexibility in Europe. Vasigh and Hamzaee (1998) empirically analyzes use 
agreements in the US and finds that these increase airport profits and capacity utilization. And 
more recently, Fuhr and Beckers (2009) finds that contractual financing agreements at US airports 
reduce public ownership inefficiencies. To the extent that these agreements create greater airport 
competition, this result may help explain Bottasso and Conti’s (2012) finding that the cost 
advantage of private sector airports has fallen over time.  
US airports, all of which are in the public sector, are the focus of the present research and 
builds upon a few other studies that analyze costs and productivity at US or North American 
airports. Zhao, Choo, and Oum (2014) examines the effect of ownership on efficiencies of North 
American (i.e., American and Canadian) airports which includes two basic forms of airport 
ownership, airport authority and government-owned (which for the US includes city, county, and 
state). The study finds that, on average, airport authorities are 14% technically more efficient than 
airports operated by the public sector.  
Craig, Airola, and Tipu’s (2012) analyzes two types of public ownership, airport authorities 
and city-owned. Consistent with Zhao, Choo, and Oum (2014), the study finds that airport 
authorities are 40% technically more efficient than city airports. However, the study also finds that 
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labor and materials inputs at airport authorities capture the bulk of these savings leading to a net 
cost advantage over city ownership of less than 5%. 
Adding to the literature, this study uses stochastic frontier analysis to analyze the cost 
efficiency implications of public sector ownership for 50 large and medium hub airports in the US. 
In addition to including all types of commercial airport ownership – city, county, state, and 
authority – this study includes multiple-airport systems. A modeling contribution is that the 
analysis explicitly controls for airport specific heterogeneity. This is important because, in the 
absence of such controls, differences across airports may be due to factors other than efficiency. 
That is, efficiency estimates may incorrectly capture airport specific heterogeneity.  
 
III. Econometric Model for Cost Function and Efficiency Estimation 
 Consistent with Aigner, Lovell, and Schmidt (1977) and Meeusen and van den Broeck 
(1977), our approach relaxes the full efficiency assumption of neoclassical production theory and 
treats inefficiency as an unobserved component by adding to the traditional two-sided error term 
itv  a one-sided error term 0itu  that captures inefficiency. Our stochastic translog variable cost 
function is  
(1)               itititit vuVCVC ++=
*lnln  
where 
*
itVC is the deterministic part of variable cost when the airport is fully efficient and is a 
function of output, input prices, and a quasi-fixed factor of production. In Section IV where we 
describe our data and Section V where we present estimation results, the specific variables used in 
our empirical model will be discussed. We assume that itu  and itv  are independent and that the 
 9 
 
two sided error term, itv , is uncorrelated with the regressors.4 When 0=itu , the airport reaches 
the minimal cost level and is considered to be fully efficient. For this analysis, we assume 
))(,0(~ 2 ituit zNu 
+
, where +N  is the half-normal distribution, itz  is a vector of exogenous 
variables determining the distribution of itu , and )exp()(
'2
uititu zz  = . In addition, we assume that 
),0(~ 2vit Nv   where )exp(
2
vv  = .
5 
Conventional cost function estimation includes input share equations in order to improve 
statistical efficiency. In a SFA setting, this might raise concerns because the itu  term captures the 
combined effect of technical and allocative efficiency, and a misallocation of inputs (i.e. allocative 
inefficiency) might affect input share equations in a non-trivial way. Kumbhakar and Wang (2006) 
demonstrate that directly modeling allocative inefficiency from the cost minimization problem 
generates a complicated form of heterogeneity which can bias the parameter estimates, i.e. uit in 
Equation (1) is heteroskedastic even when the allocative inefficiency is modeled as homoscedastic 
in the cost minimization problem.  
As this is an unresolved issue in the SFA literature, we model overall inefficiency in a 
reduced form framework. That is, we model the cost of inefficiency, itu , directly rather than 
modeling misallocation of inputs at the cost minimization stage. Equation (2) gives the system of 
equations and distribution assumptions for our empirical model, 
 
 
                                                     
4 See Kutlu (2010), Karakaplan and Kutlu (2015), and Kutlu (2016) on relaxing the exogeneity assumption. 
5 See Battese and Coelli (1992, 1995) for earlier studies using this type of specification in stochastic frontier 
analysis. 
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(2)               
ititit
itititit
wSS
vuVCVC
+=
++=
*
*lnln
 
            ))(,0(~
2
ituit zNu 
+
 
                   ),0(~
2
vit Nv   
                   ),0(~ wit Nw  . 
 
where itS  and 
*
itS  are vectors of observed and optimal input shares, respectively. Parameter 
estimates are obtained by maximizing the log-likelihood function =
ti
itLL
,
lnln , where the log-
likelihood value for unit 𝑖 at time 𝑡 corresponding to Equation (2) is: 
(3)              itwitw
S
it
S
it
Sit wwconstL
1'
2
2
2
1
ln
2
1
2
ln
2
1
lnln.ln −−−−





+−=




   
  is the cumulative distribution function for the standard normal distribution, ititit vu += , 
222
vuS  += , vu  /= , and )exp()(
'2  ititu zz = . The itz  vector is a set of explanatory 
variables that induce heteroskedasticity. 
1]ˆ|)[exp( −= ititit uEEff   provides an estimate of cost 
efficiency, where itˆ  is the estimate of ititit vu += . 
Efficiency and Heterogeneity 
In recent SFA analyses (focused on the U.S. banking industry) Almanidis (2013) and 
Almanidis, Karakaplan, and Kutlu (2015) showed that the efficiency estimates under the 
assumption that all firms share the same technology differed considerably from those obtained 
from models assuming multiple technology groups.6 Hence, if there are technological (and other 
                                                     
6 Here, technology refers to the production/cost frontiers. In particular, two productive units belong to the same 
technology group if the parameters representing their production abilities are the same. Airports are complex 
enterprises that reflect diverse technologies. For example, the FAA airports have design standards that vary by size 
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productive unit specific) differences and such differences are ignored, then a relatively efficient 
firm with less advanced technology can be misinterpreted as less efficient than its actual efficiency 
level. For example, comparing the government institutions with private institutions under the 
assumption that they share the same technology/frontier might be inappropiate.  
Only recently has the SFA literature begun to address the heterogeneity among productive 
units that is due to factors other than inefficiency. One approach, as noted above, to capture 
heterogeneity due to technological differences includes technology-group specific dummy 
variables which, for our variable cost function model, implies that the technological differences 
are captured by parallel shifts in the cost frontier. A more general way to model different 
technologies would assume a full set of different parameters for each technology group but this 
has significiant data implications. A second approach (Barros (2008) models heterogeneity by a 
random effects model.7  
And a third approach captures heterogeneity unrelated to inefficiency by including fixed 
effects dummy variables (Greene 2005a, 2005b). Greene calls this estimator the true fixed effects 
estimator. Given that the first approach may not be sufficient to capture airport specific 
heterogeneity and given the greater potential for additional endogenerity in the random effects 
model, the present study follows Greene’s fixed effects specification for controlling heterogeneity 
                                                     
and weight of aircraft, mix of aircraft using the airport, altitude, and environmental impacts U.S. DOT, FAA, Advisory 
Circular AC No: 150/5325-4B, July 1, 2005). Further, adoption of new technologies (e.g. NextGen) will not occur 
simultaneously for all airports. Other examples include airports’ land use decisions in the runway protection zone. 
Airports must coordinate with the FAA Office of Airports regarding land use and structures (e.g. schools), recreation, 
transportation (e.g. rail and parking), and fuel and hazardous materials storage (FAA Memorandum, September 27, 
2012), all of which reflect a rich mix of technologies. In our empirical model, these and other technology differences 
are captured by the productive unit specific dummy variables. Hence, the productive units share the same parameter 
values except the constant term (i.e., fixed effects). 
7 If the heteroegeneity is correlated with the inefficiency term or regressors, the random effects model will produce 
inconsistent parameter and efficiency estimates. This implies that random effects models, in stochastic frontier 
framework, are more prone to a potential endogeneity problem compared with the conventional random effects 
models. That is, the error term for efficiency introduces additional sources of endogeneity. 
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unrelated to inefficiency. That is, we include panel unit specific dummy variables when modelling 
*ln itVC .  This is one of the other differences between our study and those of Zhao, Choo, and Oum 
(2014) and Craig, Airola, and Tipu (2011), which do not control for such heterogeneity.8 Hence, 
in theory, airport specific heterogeneity may have biased these studies’ efficiency estimates in a 
non-systematic way. In the empirical section, we present evidence supporting such biases for the 
cost efficiency estimates for US airports.   
    
IV. Sample and Data Sources  
 The sample for the analysis includes all medium and large hub airports in the contiguous 
United States for the thirteen year period 1996 – 2008 and for which data were consistently 
available during the period. Appendix II identifies the airports included in the analysis, the 
airport’s hub status, whether the airport is part of a multi-airport system and, if so, whether airport 
ownershlip is common across airports.9  
 The output measure for the study is airline departures.10 The Bureau of Transportation 
Statistics (http://www.transtats.bts.gov), the FAA (Compliance Activity Tracking System (CATS, 
http://cats.airports.faa.gov) and the National Flight Data Center (http://nfdc.faa.gov) provided data 
on airline departures and airport operating costs, runways and ownership, respectively. For the 
analysis, operating expenses (i.e. variable costs) comprise expenditures on three inputs: 1) labor; 
2) contracting, repair/maintenance; and 3) general airport operations. Labor costs include 
                                                     
8 Zhao, Choo, and Oum (2014) include a Canada dummy variable. 
9 The sample covers large and medium airports in the contiguous US and all but one large hub and twenty-four of 
thirty-two medium hubs in the contiguous US. In 2008, all primary and non-primary commercial service airports in 
the contiguous US accounted for 88.5% of all enplanements. Airports in this sample account for 79.3% of all 
enplanements in the contiguous US. For more information about the data set see McCarthy (2014).  
10 We also estimated a model using passengers rather than departures as the output measure. In general, the results 
were similar. More details will be provided when we present estimation results in Section V. 
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expenditures on wages/salary, benefits and pensions to airport employees; contracting, 
maintenance, and repair costs include expenditures on supplies and materials, repairs and 
maintenance, and contractual services (e.g. management, financial, engineering, firefighting); and 
general airport operations costs include expenditures on communications and utilities costs, 
insurance costs and claims, and small miscellaneous expenses.11  
 Estimating cost functions requires data on input prices which are rarely available. This 
study is no exception as the FAA does not provide these data and there are no data series on airport 
wages, contracting/maintenance and repairs, and airport operations, whether by airport or MSA. 
However, there do exist national price indices for each input and there are MSA regional price 
indices. Using national and MSA price indices, we adopted a methodology to estimate airport-
specific input prices that included the following steps: 1) collect national price indices for each of 
the inputs for 1996-2008; 2) adjust for MSA regional price differences which generates price 
variation across geography and time and normalize to 2005; and 3) use the GDP deflator (2005 = 
100) to convert costs to real costs and nominal price indices to real price indices.12 
The quasi-fixed factor in the analysis is the Effective Number of Standard Runways 
(ENSRit), defined as 000,500,1/)Width)(Length(ENSR
r
ritritit = , i.e. total runway capacity 
divided by capacity for a 10,000’ by 150’ runway, which can generally accommodate any size 
commercial aircraft. At the mean, the sample airports had 3.5 actual runways and 3.13 ENSRs. 
                                                     
11 For a more complete definition of these categories, see U.S. DOT, FAA, Advisory Circular AC No: 150/5100-19C, 
April 19, 2004.  
12 Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Department of Labor, Consumer Price Index, CPI Databases, 
http://www.bls.gov/cpi/data.htm (series BBLD--, Material and supply inputs to nonresidential building construction). 
Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Department of Labor, Occupational Employment Statistics 
(http://www.bls.gov/cew/data.htm). The basis for the MSA price indices is NAICS classification data from QCEW 
aggregate level 40 (Total MSA Covered). The adopted methodology introduces a measurement error in the price 
variables, biasing the estimated coefficients towards 0 to the extent that there is large variability in the measurement 
error (Greene, 2000). 
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Finally, the model controls for other factors that studies have found to affect airport costs. 
The share of international departures, defined as the ratio of number of international departures 
and total number of departures for an airport, accounts for additional costs associated with 
international flights. And the share of freight, defined as the ratio of freight weight and the sum of 
freight and passenger weight (assuming that a passenger (along with their luggage) is equivalent 
to 220 pounds of cargo), captures the extent to which cargo operations affect airport costs. In 
addition, the FAA CATS provides data on non-aeronautical revenues that the airport derives from 
parking and retail activities. The model includes two variables, the share of total non-aeronautical 
revenues from parking and retail activities, to reflect these terminal service activities.13 
Table 2 provides descriptive statistics for airport departures, costs, input shares, price 
indices, and some control variables.14 The analysis includes four ownership  categories, city (36%), 
airport/port authority (44%), county (16%), and state (4%). For the full sample, Table 2, provides 
descriptive statistics for departures, in total, by ownership, and whether the airport is part of a 
multiple airport system, as well as total costs, input shares and the quasi-fixed capital. 
For the sample as a whole, airports handled an average 129,368 departures and incurred 
$111.76 million in costs to operate the airport and conduct its varied activities. Airports expended 
on average 37.9%, 39.8%, and 22.3% of operating costs on personnel, contractual/maintenance, 
and general operations (i.e. all other operating expenses). As expected, there was greater variation 
in departures, costs, and cost shares across airports than across time. On the other hand, there was  
 
 
                                                     
13 Rather than including these variables to control for the effects of cargo and non-aeronautical terminal activities, an 
alternative approach specifies cargo (or cargo-related variable) and non-aeronautical revenues as airport outputs in a 
multi-product cost function (e.g. Oum, Yan, and Yu (2008), Botasso and Conti (2012)). When estimating a SFA model 
with airport fixed effects, a single output with control variables for cargo and non-aeronautical was more robust than 
a multi-output specification.  
14 There are 649 rather than 650 observations in the sample because the Bergstrom International Airport in Austin, 
Texas was not operational until 1997.   
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       Table 2 
             Descriptive Statistics, 1996 – 2008 
              50 Medium and Large Hub Airports
 
 
# Obs Mean Std Dev
Full Sample Total Departures 649 129,368 96,154
Ownership Type City 233 172,253 128,226
County 104 103,042 68,850
State 26 73,144 34,860
Airport/Port Authority 286 109,114 57,975
Airport System Multiple 195 153,846 117,993
 Separate Ownership 104 131,732 120,837
Joint Ownership 91 179,118 109,949
Single 454 118,854 83,033
Hub Size Large 338 185,030 97,660
Multiple Airport System 143 195,691 111,241
Medium 311 68,874 43,690
Multiple Airport System 52 38,770 9,665
Total Operating Costs, 2005 $ 649 111,762,040$    109,811,593     
Ownership Type City 233 115,084,391$    109,863,776     
County 104 109,881,254$    104,794,281     
State 26 63,357,216$     42,631,047       
Airport/Port Authority 286 114,139,731$    115,038,850     
Airport System Multiple 195 191,503,850$    156,111,587     
 Separate Ownership 104 142,225,268$    143,846,183     
Joint Ownership 91 247,822,229$    151,125,828     
Single 454 77,511,703$     53,847,237       
Hub Size Large 338  $   173,738,797       121,498,558 
Multiple Airport System 143  $   249,657,671       143,117,002 
Medium 311  $     44,404,665         20,469,768 
Multiple Airport System 52  $     31,580,843         10,758,321 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Cost Shares
Contractural, Repair/Maintenance 649 39.8% 13.7
General Airport Operations 649 22.3% 13.7
Personnel 649 37.9% 12.2
Real Price Indices (2005 = 100)
Personnel 649 97.37 6.43
Airport Operations 649 90.17 11.8
Contractural, Repair/Maintenance 649 92.39 13.16
Quasi-Fixed Capital
Equivalent Number of 10,000' x 150' runways 649 3.128 1.609
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Across Airports Total Departures 50 129,368 337,893
` Total Operating Costs, 2005 $ 50 111,762,040 386,647,556
Cost Shares
Contractural, Repair/Maintenance 50 39.80% 41.7
General Airport Operations 50 22.30% 35.1
Personnel 50 37.90% 38.7
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Across Time Total Departures 13 129,368 107,103
Total Operating Costs, 2005 $ 13 111,762,040 114,511,544
Cost Shares
Contractural, Repair/Maintenance 13 39.80% 25.2
General Airport Operations 13 22.30% 29.4
Personnel 13 37.90% 8.0
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greater variation in prices across time than across airports.15 
From Table 2, the predominant form of ownership for airports with the most departures is 
city ownership, with an average of over 170,000 departures. Airport authority and county 
ownerships are similar in terms of departures handled (109,114 and 103,042 respectively) and 
larger than state-owned airports (73,344). On the cost side, however, average operating costs at 
airports under city ownership are very similar to those with airport authority and county ownership 
types ($115 million versus $114 and $109 million) even though a city handles a significantly 
higher number of aircraft departures (e.g. 57.8% relative to an airport authority). 
Table 2 also reports departure movements and costs for multi-airport systems where, on 
average, an airport as part of a multi-airport system handles more than the sample average number 
of departures. But this also depends on whether the airport is jointly governed. An airport in the 
sample that is part of a multi-airport system under common or joint ownership  handles nearly 
180,000 departures in comparison with 131,732 departures that an airport handles when part of a 
multi-airport system that is not under joint ownership. Whereas an airport under common 
ownership handles 35% more departures, these airports have 74.2% higher operating expenses, 
suggesting diseconomies associated with joint ownership.   
Significant operating and cost differences also exist between large and medium hub 
airports. The average number of departures at large hubs is 2.7 times greater, 185,030 versus 
68,874 at medium hub airports. But large hub airports incur costs that are nearly 4 times higher 
than medium hubs, $173.7 versus $44.4 million. Accentuating this difference even more, a large 
hub airport that is part of a multi-airport system handles five times as many departures than a 
medium hub counterpart but it does so at nearly nine times the cost ($249.7 versus $31.6 million). 
                                                     
15 The standard deviation of the real price of personnel, contractual/maintenance, and general operations was 6.29, 
1.69, and 1.74 across airports but 39.8, 96.5, and 86.5 across time. 
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V. Estimation Results   
 Table 3 reports three sets of maximum likelihood estimation results:  1) a Benchmark 
model, which includes fixed effects that controls for airport specific heterogeneity; 2) a No-fixed-
effects model, which doesn’t include fixed effects; and 3) a Passenger model, which controls for 
airport specific heterogeneity but number of passengers as the output measure.16 In each model, 
Contractual, Repair/Maintenance is the input share equation dropped. From the table, the 
explanatory variables that induce heterogenerity (the zit vector in Section III) includes a constant 
term, the quasi-fixed factor of production ( k/kln it ) and its square, a time trend and its square, 
and dummy variables for large hub, local airport ownership, presence of multiple airports in the 
geographic area, and joint ownership where the same entity (e.g. New York-New Jersey Port 
Authority)  owns and is responsible for the operations.17 
A priori, the models satisfy linear homogeneity in prices and factor price symmetry. In the 
benchmark model, the monotonicity and concavity conditions are satisfied at almost all points (3 
violations out of 649 observations).18 Compared to conventional cost function estimation, 
regularity conditions are more important for the stochastic frontier models. Sauer, Frohberg, and 
Hockmann (2006) note that theoretically inconsistent frontiers over- or understate the inefficiency, 
which could result in counterproductive policy measures. Without controlling for heterogeneity by 
airport fixed effects, as suggested by Greene (2005), the regularity conditions are violated (about 
13.1% (85/649) violation rate in our case).19 Moreover, the likelihood ratio test rejects the  
                                                     
16 See the Appendix I for more details about variables. 
17 Output and input prices were demeaned using each airport’s average for the sample period. Demeaning for the 
quasi-fixed factor was based upon the sample average due to limited variation in runway capacity across airports. 
18 Zhao et al.’s (2014) stochastic frontier analysis does not comment on regularity conditions and concavity of the 
estimated function. Craig et al.’s (2005) symmetric generalized cost function has the property of global concavity. 
19 One potential issue for Greene’s (2005) true fixed effects approach, where heterogeneity is captured by panel unit 
dummies, is that the parameter estimates may be subject to so called incidental parameters problem. Belotti, Daidone, 
Ilardi, and Atella (2013) argues that this approach may be acceptable when the length of the panel is at least 10. 
Moreover, Belotti and Ilardi (2014) argues that when the length of the panel is 10 this model behaves quite well. When 
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Table 3: Stochastic Frontier Estimation Results* 
 Benchmark No-Fixed-Effects Passenger 
Parameter Estimate Std Err Pr>|t| Estimate Std Err Pr>|t| Estimate Std Err Pr>|t| 
Constant 17.7705 0.0436 0.0000 17.7856 0.0647 0.0000 17.7715 0.0330 0.0000 
𝒒 (Departures) 0.4609 0.0806 0.0000 0.5541 0.2580 0.0317 0.6174 0.0888 0.0000 
𝒒𝟐 0.0828 0.1941 0.6696 -1.3969 0.6463 0.0307 -0.0776 0.3222 0.8097 
𝒌 (ENSR) -0.0362 0.1295 0.7798 0.8369 0.0375 0.0000 -0.0095 0.0678 0.8888 
𝒌𝟐 -0.8749 0.4289 0.0414 0.9187 0.0857 0.0000 -0.7397 0.2665 0.0055 
𝒒 ∗ 𝒌 -0.3591 0.1001 0.0003 -0.3820 0.2822 0.1758 -0.2225 0.0951 0.0194 
𝒍 (Personnel Price) 0.3854 0.0047 0.0000 0.3868 0.0047 0.0000 0.3853 0.0047 0.0000 
𝒆 (Operations Price) 0.2195 0.0053 0.0000 0.2189 0.0053 0.0000 0.2198 0.0053 0.0000 
𝒍𝟐 -0.1198 0.0609 0.0494 -0.0701 0.0624 0.2616 -0.1375 0.0581 0.0179 
𝒆𝟐 -0.6855 0.1143 0.0000 -0.6490 0.1147 0.0000 -0.7059 0.1050 0.0000 
𝒍 ∗ 𝒆 0.3570 0.0662 0.0000 0.3158 0.0671 0.0000 0.3710 0.0606 0.0000 
𝒍 ∗ 𝒒 -0.0546 0.0269 0.0422 -0.0414 0.0269 0.1245 -0.1108 0.0335 0.0009 
𝒆 ∗ 𝒒 0.0096 0.0309 0.7552 -0.0002 0.0310 0.9956 0.0492 0.0375 0.1891 
𝒍 ∗ 𝒌 0.0641 0.0093 0.0000 0.0687 0.0094 0.0000 0.0642 0.0093 0.0000 
𝒆 ∗ 𝒌 -0.0152 0.0106 0.1522 -0.0165 0.0106 0.1199 -0.0150 0.0106 0.1578 
𝒒 ∗ 𝑳𝒐𝒄𝒂𝒍 Ownership -0.3419 0.0591 0.0000 -0.2288 0.2534 0.3666 -0.2710 0.0672 0.0001 
𝒌 ∗ 𝒒 ∗ 𝑻𝒐𝒑𝟏𝟎𝑬𝑵𝑺𝑹  0.4285 0.2181 0.0494 -0.4080 0.6658 0.5400 -0.1124 0.2837 0.6920 
q*Large Hub 0.0625 0.0665 0.3474 0.0244 0.2600 0.9251 -0.0021 0.0745 0.9780 
Share of int’l departures 0.7756 0.2181 0.0004 -0.0490 1.6051 0.9757 0.0730 0.2271 0.7479 
Share of freight 0.0612 0.1168 0.6000 -1.1594 0.3565 0.0011 0.0825 0.1024 0.4205 
Parking (% in Revenue) -0.2427 0.1002 0.0154 0.3251 0.3627 0.3700 -0.1942 0.1106 0.0792 
Retail (% in Revenue) 0.1700 0.0952 0.0740 0.7089 0.7289 0.3308 0.2615 0.0990 0.0082 
Year Dummy Variables 
D1998  0.0236 0.0217 0.2763 -0.0601 0.0772 0.4366 0.0161 0.0289 0.5777 
D1999 0.0868 0.0196 0.0000 -0.0574 0.0780 0.4619 0.0647 0.0238 0.0065 
D2000  0.0891 0.0188 0.0000 -0.0910 0.0792 0.2505 0.0372 0.0218 0.0875 
D2001  0.1188 0.0198 0.0000 -0.1250 0.0874 0.1529 0.0918 0.0216 0.0000 
D2002  0.1541 0.0271 0.0000 -0.0405 0.0932 0.6639 0.1511 0.0283 0.0000 
D2003  0.2020 0.0248 0.0000 -0.0154 0.1011 0.8790 0.2081 0.0259 0.0000 
D2004  0.1766 0.0242 0.0000 -0.0546 0.1046 0.6016 0.1636 0.0251 0.0000 
D2005  0.1777 0.0259 0.0000 -0.0495 0.1025 0.6287 0.1508 0.0245 0.0000 
D2006  0.1636 0.0247 0.0000 -0.0547 0.1009 0.5880 0.1300 0.0260 0.0000 
D2007  0.1904 0.0254 0.0000 -0.0346 0.1065 0.7453 0.1455 0.0217 0.0000 
D2008  0.1941 0.0239 0.0000 0.0004 0.1046 0.9971 0.1577 0.0226 0.0000 
2(u)          
Constant -1.1832 0.0222 0.0000 -10.5313 0.0770 0.0000 -1.1356 0.0210 0.0000 
Hub -0.7636 0.1253 0.0000 9.5826 0.2512 0.0000 -0.6367 0.1291 0.0000 
Local 0.4537 0.0260 0.0000 0.4081 0.2774 0.1412 0.3303 0.0380 0.0000 
MAP (Multiple Airport) -0.1233 0.0695 0.0759 1.5728 0.0097 0.0000 -0.2293 0.0649 0.0004 
MAPJO (Jointly Operated) 0.2971 0.1599 0.0631 0.0898 0.2072 0.6647 0.0458 0.2116 0.8287 
𝒌 0.2344 0.0560 0.0000 -0.8637 0.0249 0.0000 0.3129 0.0703 0.0000 
𝒌𝟐 0.2935 0.1118 0.0086 -1.6092 0.0324 0.0000 0.2960 0.0831 0.0004 
𝒕 (Trend) -0.5013 0.0100 0.0000 0.0115 0.0117 0.3269 -0.4917 0.0088 0.0000 
𝒕𝟐 0.0280 0.0006 0.0000 -0.0013 0.0016 0.4255 0.0273 0.0006 0.0000 
2(v)          
Constant -10.3026 0.0221 0.0000 -2.0533 0.0689 0.0000 -10.3430 0.0213 0.0000 
Log-likelihood 1405.9 
87.6 
3/649 
  525.5   1420.9  
Median Efficiency   80.9   87.7  
# of Violations   85/649   12/649  
*To facilitate reading the table, the first instance of q, k, l, and e identifies the variables name. 
 
 
                                                     
the length of panel is 15 they mention that the finite sample properties are very good. In our data set the number of 
time periods is 13, which seems to be reasonably large enough to avoid the effects of incidental parameters problem.  
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restricted No-Fixed-Effects model at any conventional significance level. Hence, the Benchmark 
model dominates the No-Fixed-Effects model on theoretical and statistical grounds. We also 
compared the efficiency estimates from the Benchmark and No-Fixed-Effects models in order to 
examine the success of the efficiency estimates from the No-Fixed-Effects model. A Kolmogorov-
Smirnov test rejects the equality of distributions at any conventional levels. Moreover, the Pearson 
and Spearman correlations of efficiency estimates are -0.07 and 0.03, which clearly reflects how 
different the efficiency estimates can be when not controlling for airport-specific heterogeneity. 
In Table 3 iitit LLl /ln=  and iitit EEe /ln=  stand for input prices for Personnel and Airport 
Operations, respectively.20 The model in Table 3 includes a term that is the product of output 
measure ( iitit QQq /ln= ) and a dummy variable Local that equals 1 if the city or an airport/port 
authority owns the airport and 0 otherwise. This captures technological differences that may exist 
for airports locally governed relative to airports governed at a more aggregate county or state 
level.21 Also included in the model is the product of itq  and ENSR (the capital measure
KKk itit /ln= ), and Top10ENSR, a dummy variable that equals 1 if the airport is among the top 
10 airports in terms of the quasi-fixed factor of production. 22 Without this term the marginal cost 
estimates for these airports were negative for 4.2% (27/649) of the observations.23 This may be 
                                                     
20 These variables are further normalized to assure homogeneity in prices. See Appendix I for further details about 
acronyms and transformations applied to the variables, i.e., log-demean, demean, or no transformation. 
21 Prior estimations could not reject the null hypothesis that the coefficients for city and airport authority ownership 
were equal and that state and county ownership types be the reference category.  
22 As mentioned earlier, relative to standard translog models, non-negative marginal costs (i.e., monotonicity with 
respect to output) and curvature regularity conditions (i.e., concavity with respect to input prices) are more important 
for stochastic frontier models. Further, a likelihood ratio test based upon the reported model and a model that excluded 
the product of ititkq   and Top10ENSR rejected the null hypothesis that the model omit this term.  
23 We also tried Top5ENSR and Top15ENSR dummy variables, which are dummies for top 5 and top 15 airports. 
While the median efficiency levels were very close, the regularity condition are violated more than 5.2% and 4.2%, 
respectively. Moreover, the log likelihood value for Top10ENSR was higher. This is in line with our heuristic choice 
for top 10 airports.  
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attributed to the fact that some of the airports have particularly higher capital levels relative to the 
median airport. This additional term gives us the flexibility to capture this pattern. On average, 
these airports had 2.7 more ENSRs (5.2 vs. 2.5), a difference which can potentially affect the cost 
structure.  
Two dummy variables model efficiency and joint ownership: a multiple airport dummy 
variable (MAP) equals 1 if there are multiple airports in the same metropolitan area, 0 otherwise; 
and a multiple airport joint ownership dummy variable (MAPJO) that equals 1 for metropolitan 
areas with more than 1 airport and with joint ownership, 0 otherwise. For the sample, areas with 
joint ownership include Chicago (Midway and Chicago O’Hare), New York-New Jersey (JFK, 
LaGuardia, Newark), and Washington DC (Washington National and Dulles).  
 
Robustness Checks 
In order to check the robustness of our results to choice of output the third model in Table 
3 uses passengers rather than departures as the output measure. The results are similar except for 
some relatively small differences in the output-related variables. For example, the median for 
returns to capacity utilization were 2.56, lower than the 3.56 using departures.  
As a second robustness check, we define MAP in our analysis by the presence of multiple 
airports in the same metropolitan statistical area. For our sample, a notable exception is  
Baltimore/Washington International (BWI) which is not part of the Washington metropolitan 
statistical area but it is only 33 miles driving distance from Washington DC. In order to check the 
robustness of our results to the definition of MAP variable, we used an alternative multiple-airport 
variable, MAPalt, that included BWI and Washington the DC airports, San Diego and Long-
Beach-Los Angeles, Austin-Bergstrom International and San Antonio, and Indianapolis and 
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Cincinnati-Northern Kentrucky as part of a multiple airport system. Appendix II identifies the 
MAPalt variable and Appendix III reports the regression results.24  
A third robustness check focused on the definition of a hub airport. This analysis uses the 
FAA definition which identifies a hub airport by the number of annual passenger boardings. Rather 
than a size-based measure of hub, a competitive-based measure (often used in market analyses) 
focuses on airlines that have established hub operations at various airports. In exploring this, for 
all FAA-defined large hubs in the sample, with the exception of Las Vegas, the airport serves as a 
hub for some airline. To evaluate whether this affects our results, we define an alternative dummy 
variable for large hubs (HubMkt). The HubMkt variable equals 1 if an airport is a large hub by the 
FAA definition and also serves as a hub for an airline. By this definition, HubMkt equals 0 for 
Nevada McCarran (LAS) because this is not a hub airport for any airline. In Appendix III, we 
report the regression outputs using this variable.25The results in Table 3 indicate short run returns 
to scale, with a median value for the sample equal to 3.56.26 Own price input demand elasticities 
are negative and price inelastic for Personnel (-0.94) and Contractual, Repair/Maintenance (-0.83). 
For General Airport Operations, demand is price elastic (-3.93), which reflects the many and varied 
types of airport activities in this category. Estimated cross price elasticities indicate that General 
Airport Operations is a substitute for Personnel and Contractual, Repair/Maintenance but that 
Personnel and Contractual, Repair/Maintenance are complements in production. Also, the 
                                                     
24 A reviewer correctly noted that BWI, although not in the same metropolitan statistical area, is likely in the same 
multi-airport market for airline travel. To explore the effects of this, we used distance and popular (i.e.newspaper) 
accounts of the markets to identify the four groupings.  
25 Although FAA defined and market-based hubs are highly correlated, this is less true for medium hubs. In the sample, 
twelve medium hubs, by FAA’s definition, do not serve as airline or market-based hubs. Using the market-based 
definition, the reference category for the hub variable is now non-large hubs included in the sample rather than medium 
hubs.  
26 See Caves et al. (1981) on the relationship between short and long run returns to capacity utilization. The formula 
for scale economies is: 𝑅𝑇𝑆 = (1 −
𝜕ln (𝑉𝐶)
𝜕ln (𝑘)
)
𝜕ln (𝑉𝐶)
𝜕ln (𝑞)
⁄  which coincides with long run economies of scale if investment 
in the quasi-fixed factor is optimal. 
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coefficients for the time trend and its square in the inefficiency term indicate that during the sample 
period airport inefficiencies decreased until 2003 and increased afterwards.27  
 
Airport Ownership and Heterogeneity 
In order to get some understanding of the cost efficiency implications of airport ownership 
and other operational-related indicators, we identified a benchmark counterfactual and then 
calculated the impact on costs when one or more indicators are present. Table 4 reports the median 
percentage change in average variable costs due to cost efficiency under four different scenarios. 
For each scenario, input prices, departures, and the quasi-fixed factor are set to their actual values. 
Assumptions on the indicator variables (Hub Size, Local Ownership, Multi-Airport MSA, Multi-
Airport Joint Ownership MSA) generate the alternative scenarios. The counterfactual scenarios 
are:28 
1. Benchmark counterfactual – To generate the benchmark counterfactual, set all indicator 
variables to zero. Then calculate the percentage change in median average variable cost 
due to cost efficiency for those airports whose row indicator equals one and zero, 
respectively.  
For example, in the first row of Table 4, the dummy variables for Multi-Airport MSA and 
Large Hub are set to zero. This benchmark counterfactual then compares the median 
average variable cost for a medium hub airport that not part of a multi-airport system and 
                                                     
27 The parameters in the inefficiency term, u, are identified through the asymmetric distribution of this random 
variable. Hence, identification does not solely rely on the means of these variables. Because the coefficients of these 
variables are significant and the likelihood ratio test favors our benchmark model at 5% significance levels, we prefer 
to include them in our model. The average efficiency values and patterns of time-effects are similar.  
28 The stochastic frontier estimates for efficiency rely on the assumption that airports minimize costs conditional on a 
given amount of output. If airports have different sets of incentives (e.g. political as described on page 1) and sacrifice 
efficiency for other purposes, this would be captured as inefficiency. Thus, underlying our counterfactual analysis is 
the cost minimization idea. At the same time, however, airport specific dummies may capture differences that may 
exist in airport objectives.   
 23 
 
has a county/state ownership form (i.e. Local Ownership equals 0) with an airport that is a 
medium hub, not part of a multi-airport system, but with a city/(air)port authority form of 
ownership (i.e. Local Ownership equals 1); 
2. Conditioning counterfactuals – There are three conditioning counterfactuals corresponding 
to Columns (2) – (4). Calculate the percentage change in medians of average variable costs 
due to cost efficiency when a particular row indicator (e.g. Large Hub) equals one and zero, 
as in the above scenario, but now with a conditioning indicator (e.g. Local Ownership, 
Column (2)) set to one. For example, for the first row and third column (Multi-Airport 
MSA), Multi-Airport MSA dummy is set to one and Large Hub dummy is set to zero.   
 
Table 4: Changes in the Estimated Average Variable Cost (%) 
 
 
Benchmark Counterfactual 
The benchmark results indicate that none of the four indicator types as a single 
differentiator, is dominant in cost efficiency.29 Locally governed airports only have 1.02% lower 
average variable costs (due to cost efficiency) than county or state-owned airports. And separate 
ownership of multiple airports within a MSA leads to a 1.91% cost reduction. The MAVC for a 
                                                     
29 In the Benchmark scenario, the number of observations used to calculate the percentage change is 221, 26, 0, and 
39 (i.e., no observations and identified by the ‘-‘s in the table.). For example, the number of observations which are 
local ownership but not multiairport or large hub is 221. Similarly, the number of observations which are hub but not 
multiairport or local ownership is 39.  
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Indicator Variable Benchmark 
1 
Local Ownership 
2 
Multi - Airport MSA 
3 
Large Hub 
4 
Local Ownership - 1.02 n/a 9.59 1.56 
Multi - Airport MSA - 1.91 8.60 na 2.11 
Multi - Airport Joint Ownership MSA - - - - 
Large Hub - 1.22 1.36 2.83 n/a 
Conditioning Indicators 
Counterfactual Scenarios 
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county/state-owned airport that is a large hub and the only commercial airport in the MSA, is only 
1.22% lower than a similarly situated medium hub airport. 
 
Conditioning Counterfactuals 
The underlying assumptions for Columns (2) – (4) are the same as for the benchmark 
counterfactuals except that the results are now conditioned on one of the other indicator variables. 
From the results, we see that the effect of Local Ownership on average variable cost due to cost 
efficiency changes considerably when the airport is in a multi-airport MSA, -1.02% versus 9.59%. 
However, the magnitude of change in MAVC (due to cost efficiency) of Local Ownership remains 
similar (1.56%) when the airport is a large hub. Also, there are mixed results in MAVC of Multi-
Airport MSA depending on the type of ownership. Multi-Airport MSA ownership is most 
(negatively) effective in cost efficiency when accompanied by local ownership (8.6% more variable 
costs).  
Other Results 
Table 5 reports the median values for cost efficiency, average variable cost, marginal cost, 
and efficient marginal cost (the airport’s counterfactual marginal departure cost should the airport 
operate fully efficiently (Kutlu and Sickles (2012)).30 Efficiency is given as percentages and 
monetary unit is the US dollar.  
 For the overall sample, Column (1) indicates that airports have an estimated 87.6% cost 
efficiency. But depending on hub size and airport ownership, cost efficiency ranges from a low of 
85.2% for Multi-Airport Joint Ownership MSA to a high of 88.6% for airports that the county or  
 
                                                     
30 Efficient Marginal Cost = Marginal Cost*Efficiency. Note that median of MC and EMC may not come from the 
same airport-time pair. The percentage difference in MC and EMC medians, ranging from 13%-25% is relatively high 
but this does not necessarily translate to efficiency differences. 
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Table 5: Estimated Cost Measures * 
Sample Medians 
  [1] [2] [3] [4] 
  
Cost 
Efficiency 
Average 
Variable 
Cost 
Marginal 
Cost  
Efficient 
Marginal 
Cost 
Sample    87.6 784.3 214.9 173.5 
Hub Size 
Large 87.4 866.9 234.2 203.3 
Medium 88.3 696.3 173.7 129.7 
Local Ownership  
Yes 87.4 799.5 173.7 139.7 
No 88.6 838.2 574.4 476.2 
Multi-Airport MSA 
Yes 86.9 1034.0 367.3 299.1 
No 88.2 706.3 174.5 139.0 
Multi-Airport Joint Ownership MSA 
Yes 85.2 1233.5 344.8 289.2 
No 87.4 949.2 463.7 404.7 
* The formula for efficient marginal cost is estimated marginal cost MCit multiplied by cost efficiency 1]ˆ|)[exp( −= ititit uEEff  . 
 
 
state owns. Hence, none of the individual ownership types has a substantial effect on cost 
efficiency. 
The absence of coordinating benefits in multiple airport MSAs is also apparent in Table 5. 
Jointly governed airports have 30% higher average variable costs relative to separately governed 
airports.  
 
VII. Concluding Comments 
This study aims to add to the growing literature on public sector ownership and its impact 
on costs. Even though all US commercial airports are in the public sector, not all commercial 
public sector airports may be equally efficient. The specific form of airport ownership may have 
implications for technical and cost efficiency. Hence, our interest is to understand the implications 
of ownership types on efficiency and the importance of airport specific heterogeneity when 
estimating efficiencies of airports. Following Greene (2005), we use a stochastic frontier model 
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that controls for airport specific heterogeneity via airport fixed effects. This way we illustrate the 
importance of controlling heterogeneity in the stochastic frontier setting; and in particular for a 
sample fifty medium and large hub airports in the US.  
When estimating our model without controlling for airport specific heterogeneity, median 
efficiency was 80.9% in comparison with the 87.6% we found when controlling for heterogeneity. 
And reflecting an improved specification, 0.5% and 13.1% regularity conditions were violated 
with and without modeling airport specific heterogeneity, respectively. Focusing upon large and 
medium size hub airports, the benchmark and counterfactual results indicate that: 1) there is less 
than a 2% improvement in cost efficiency when comparing costs across a single indicator – local 
versus non-local ownership, multi-airport MSA versus single airport MSA, and large versus 
medium hub; 2) there is a relatively small decrease in some conditional cost efficiencies. In 
particular large hubs in locally governed cities and large hubs in multi-airport MSAs have higher 
average costs than their medium hub counterparts. These cost efficiency differences range from 
1.4% - 2.8%; and 3) there is a relatively large 8.6-9.59% difference in cost efficiency for locally 
governed airports in multi-airport MSAs. Each of the latter two results is robust to the conditioning 
factor. For example, conditioned on large hub, airports in a multi-airport MSA have 2.1% higher 
average costs. Conversely, conditioned on a multi-airport MSA, large hubs have a 2.83% higher 
average cost.  
This study’s findings complement the findings of a number of prior studies and point to 
additional avenues of research. Finding no cost difference between city and airport/port authority 
ownership contrasts with Chao, Choo, and Oum (2014) and Craig, Airola, and Tipu (2012), which 
find cost efficiencies associated with an airport/port authority form of ownership. Also, from the 
benchmark results, there is a small 1% cost efficiency difference between city and port authority 
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ownership relative to county or state owned airports. This suggests that studies which combine all 
forms of public sector ownership into a single index may be an appropriate specification when 
modeling public versus private sector ownership. Further, this result implies that the regulatory 
structure in the US airport sector fosters a competitive environment, consistent with works of Adler 
and Liebert (2014), Oum, Yu, and Fu (2003), and Barbot (2011).  
At the same time, the counterfactual analysis identifies specific situations in which local 
ownership at the city or airport/port authority level does matter and leads to lower cost efficiency. 
When located in multi-airport MSAs, locally governed airports have average costs that are 8%-9% 
higher relative to comparable airports in a single airport MSA. This result is consistent with the 
work of Martin and Voltes-Dorta (2011) and Martin, Roman, and Voltes-Dorta (2009) that found 
higher unit costs in multi- relative to single airport cities and with coordinating difficulties 
associated with jointly-run airports such as the New York-New Jersey Port Authority.  
The current study raises a number issues for further research. One, expanding the data set 
to the most recent year and including large, medium, and small hubs would increase the number 
of observations, which would enable a richer set of empirical specifications. In particular, the 
conditioning results for multi-airport and jointly governed airports include a small number of 
airports. Enlarging the sample to include more airports would inform on whether the conditioning 
effects are representative. Two, and related, this study estimates a relatively high estimate for 
returns to capacity utilization, consistent with McCarthy (2014) using the same data but higher 
than estimates from other studies. A richer set of data and analyses would help identify reasons for 
these differences and is a fruitful area of research as it has important investment and policy 
implications. Third, this study focuses on forms of ownership. Complementing these data with 
detailed information the extent to which airport management is outsourced would provide 
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important insights on why alternative forms of ownership affect costs. Fourth, what specific roles 
do federal, state, and local regulations have in creating a competitive environment and affecting 
airport operations and costs? Fifth, in our study we model heterogeneity via airport dummies. In 
general, the heterogeneity may change over time or it may be determined through a particular 
variable that is “measuring” intrinsic differences of airports (Kutlu, 2015). With our data set such 
an analysis was not feasible. However, if the data set is extended to have more time periods, such 
an analysis may provide a more accurate analysis of the relationship between ownership type and 
efficiency. Last, an underlying assumption is that US commercial airports seek cost efficiency. 
Understanding the extent to which publicly-owned airports pursue other goals and how this affects 
cost efficiency by ownership type and vis-à-vis private ownership would provide additional 
insights on the trade-off between cost efficiency and these other goals. 
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Appendix I  
Acronyms 
 
 
Data and Transformations 
 
Variable Explanation  Transformation 
𝑞 Output measure  Log-demeaned  
𝑘 Capital measure  Log-demeaned 
𝑙 Personnel price  Log-demeaned 
𝑒 Airport operations price  Log-demeaned 
𝑘 Capital variable  Log-demeaned 
Share of international departures   Demeaned 
Share of freight   Demeaned 
Parking % of Parking in Non-Aeronautical Revenues  Demeaned 
Retail % of Retail in Non-Aeronautical Revenues  Demeaned 
Hub Large hub dummy   
Local Local ownership dummy   
MAP Multi-airport dummy   
MAPJO Multi-airport Joint ownership dummy   
𝑡 Time trend   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BAA
British Airports Authority (now 
Heathrow Airport Holdings Limited) OLS ordinary regression analysis
BYS Bayesian PAX passengers
CD Cobb-Douglas PPP public private partnerships
CRS constant returns to scale RTS returns to scale
DEA data envelopment analysis SFA stochastic frontier analysis
DRS decreasing returns to scale SGM Symmetric  Generalized McFadden
ECU economies of capital utilization SR short run
EU European Union TCE transaction cost economics
IRS increasing returns to scale TFP total factor productivity
K, L capital, labor TL translog
LCC Low-cost carrier UK United Kingdom
LR long run US United States
N/A Not applicable VFP variable factor productivity
NA North America
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Appendix II  
 
Airports in the Sample (2008 Hub Status)
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
  
Airport
Airport 
Code
MAP MAPalt MAPJO Local Airport
Airport 
Code
MAP MAPalt MAPJO Local
Hartsfield - Jackson Atlanta Int'l ATL* 0 0 0 1 Los Angeles Int'l LAX 1 1 0 1
General Edward Lawrence Logan Int'l BOS 0 0 0 1 La Guardia LGA 1 1 1 1
Baltimore/Washington Int'l BWI 0 1 0 0 Orlando Int'l MCO* 0 0 0 1
Charlotte/Douglas Int'l CLT 0 0 0 1 Chicago Midway Int'l MDW 1 1 1 1
Ronald Reagan Washington National DCA 1 1 1 1 Miami Int'l MIA 1 1 0 0
Denver Int'l DEN* 0 0 0 1 Minneapolis-St Paul Int'l MSP 0 0 0 1
Dallas/Fort Worth Int'l DFW* 1 1 0 1 Chicago O'hare Int'l ORD* 1 1 1 1
Detroit Metropolitan Wayne County DTW* 0 0 0 0 Philadelphia Int'l PHL 0 0 0 1
Newark Liberty Int'l EWR 1 1 1 1 Phoenix Sky Harbor Int'l PHX 0 0 0 1
Fort Lauderdale/Hollywood Int'l FLL 1 1 0 0 San Diego Int'l SAN 0 1 0 1
Washington Dulles Int'l IAD 1 1 1 1 Seattle-Tacoma Int'l SEA 0 0 0 1
John F Kennedy Int'l JFK* 1 1 1 1 Salt Lake City Int'l SLC 0 0 0 1
Mc Carran Int'l LAS* 0 0 0 0 Tampa Int'l TPA 0 0 0 1
Albuquerque Int'l Sunport ABQ 0 0 0 1 Memphis Int'l MEM 0 0 0 1
Austin-Bergstrom Int'l AUS 0 1 0 1 General Mitchell Int'l MKE 0 0 0 0
Bradley Int'l BDL 0 0 0 0 Louis Armstrong New Orleans Int'l MSY 0 0 0 1
Nashville Int'l BNA 0 0 0 1 Palm Beach Int'l PBI 1 1 0 0
Bob Hope BUR 1 1 0 1 Portland Int'l PDX 0 0 0 1
Cleveland-Hopkins Int'l CLE 0 0 0 1 Pittsburgh Int'l PIT* 0 0 0 1
Port Columbus Int'l CMH 0 0 0 1 Raleigh-Durham Int'l RDU 0 0 0 1
Cincinnati/Northern Kentucky CVG 0 1 0 1 Southwest Florida Int'l RSW 0 0 0 1
Dallas Love Field DAL 1 1 0 1 San Antonio Int'l SAT 0 1 0 1
Indianapolis Int'l IND 0 1 0 1 Sacramento Int'l SMF 0 0 0 0
Jacksonville Int'l JAX 0 0 0 1 John Wayne Airport-Orange County SNA 1 1 0 0
Kansas City Int'l MCI 0 0 0 1 Lambert-St Louis Int'l STL* 0 0 0 1
Note: * Indicates that the Top10ENSR = 1
Large Hubs
Medium Hubs
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Appendix III 
 
The following table includes three sections: The Multiple Airport section presents 
estimation results when we replace MAP with its alternative definition (MAPalt) and while 
keeping the rest of the variables the same as our benchmark model (Table 5). The frontier 
parameters for the benchmark model and this model are similar, at least in statistical sense. That 
is, the parameters generally differ little relative to their standard errors. However, there is a sign 
change in the MAP variable. As in our benchmark scenario, this change has a small effect on the 
sample median average variable cost due to inefficiency (1.55% change).  
Hub section presents estimation results when we replace Hub with its alternative definition 
and keep the rest of the variables same as our benchmark model. In general, the frontier parameters 
for this model and the benchmark model are similar as are the parameter estimates for the 
efficiency term . 
Number of Runways section presents estimation results when we include the number of 
runways as an additional regressor and keep rest of the variables same as our benchmark model. 
We again find that this model and the benchmark model produce frontier parameter estimates and 
estimates for the efficiency term that are generally similar. Note that, although the coefficient for 
number of runways is significant, the likelihood ratio test and Bayesian Information Criteria 
support the restricted model without this term. In our benchmark model the MAP and MAPJO 
coefficients are significant at 10% level. However, they become insignificant when we include 
number of runways. This outcome, however, is not contradicting with our general findings that 
governance does not have much effect on efficiency.  
We conclude that the parameter estimates and the median of efficiency estimates in these 
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models are similar to those in the benchmark model indicating that the benchmark model is robust 
to alternative models and variables.  
         Other Stochastic Frontier Estimation Results 
 Multiple Airport Hub Number of Runways 
Parameter Estimate Std Err Pr>|t| Estimate Std Err Pr>|t| Estimate Std Err Pr>|t| 
Constant 17.7807 0.0309 0.0000 17.7660 0.0297 0.0000 17.9417 0.0265 0.0000 
𝒒 (Departures) 0.4551 0.0796 0.0000 0.4693 0.0665 0.0000 0.4509 0.0871 0.0000 
𝒒𝟐 0.1008 0.1856 0.5872 0.0822 0.1943 0.6724 0.0523 0.2004 0.7943 
𝒌 (ENSR) 0.0075 0.0742 0.9194 0.0090 0.0717 0.8997 0.1604 0.0616 0.0092 
𝒌𝟐 -0.7810 0.3025 0.0098 -0.8065 0.2666 0.0025 -0.7021 0.3118 0.0243 
𝒒 ∗ 𝒌 -0.3573 0.1070 0.0008 -0.3376 0.0928 0.0003 -0.3643 0.1053 0.0005 
𝒍 (Personnel Price) 0.3852 0.0047 0.0000 0.3853 0.0047 0.0000 0.3853 0.0047 0.0000 
𝒆 (Operations Price) 0.2196 0.0053 0.0000 0.2195 0.0053 0.0000 0.2196 0.0053 0.0000 
𝒍𝟐 -0.1290 0.0615 0.0360 -0.1217 0.0609 0.0459 -0.1221 0.0611 0.0456 
𝒆𝟐 -0.6912 0.1145 0.0000 -0.6878 0.1143 0.0000 -0.6878 0.1143 0.0000 
𝒍 ∗ 𝒆 0.3641 0.0666 0.0000 0.3590 0.0662 0.0000 0.3592 0.0663 0.0000 
𝒍 ∗ 𝒒 -0.0567 0.0269 0.0351 -0.0549 0.0269 0.0411 -0.0551 0.0269 0.0405 
𝒆 ∗ 𝒒 0.0110 0.0310 0.7216 0.0102 0.0309 0.7416 0.0103 0.0309 0.7402 
𝒍 ∗ 𝒌 0.0636 0.0094 0.0000 0.0640 0.0093 0.0000 0.0639 0.0093 0.0000 
𝒆 ∗ 𝒌 -0.0148 0.0106 0.1617 -0.0149 0.0106 0.1596 -0.0150 0.0106 0.1569 
𝒒 ∗ 𝑳𝒐𝒄𝒂𝒍 -0.3445 0.0610 0.0000 -0.3461 0.0555 0.0000 -0.3409 0.0618 0.0000 
𝒌 ∗ 𝒒 ∗ 𝑻𝒐𝒑𝟏𝟎𝑬𝑵𝑺𝑹 0.4881 0.2245 0.0297 0.4068 0.2178 0.0618 0.4226 0.2353 0.0725 
q*Hub 0.0624 0.0662 0.3461 0.0538 0.0544 0.3231 0.0636 0.0683 0.3516 
Share of int’l departures 0.6966 0.2252 0.0020 0.7957 0.2180 0.0003 0.7797 0.2234 0.0005 
Share of freight 0.0546 0.1112 0.6234 0.0326 0.1112 0.7691 0.0524 0.1150 0.6487 
Parking (% in Revenue) -0.2377 0.1064 0.0255 -0.2584 0.0937 0.0058 -0.2435 0.1048 0.0202 
Retail (% in Revenue) 0.2080 0.0940 0.0270 0.1942 0.0942 0.0393 0.1812 0.0910 0.0466 
# of Runways        - - -      - - - -0.0482 0.0095 0.0000 
Year Dummy Variables          
D1998 0.0154 0.0287 0.5921 0.0243 0.0207 0.2415 0.0230 0.0212 0.2775 
D1999 0.0822 0.0214 0.0001 0.0917 0.0196 0.0000 0.0856 0.0195 0.0000 
D2000 0.0855 0.0204 0.0000 0.0941 0.0190 0.0000 0.0873 0.0189 0.0000 
D2001 0.1133 0.0210 0.0000 0.1231 0.0193 0.0000 0.1189 0.0183 0.0000 
D2002 0.1499 0.0262 0.0000 0.1643 0.0243 0.0000 0.1580 0.0234 0.0000 
D2003 0.1980 0.0250 0.0000 0.2134 0.0232 0.0000 0.2047 0.0233 0.0000 
D2004 0.1682 0.0242 0.0000 0.1893 0.0227 0.0000 0.1795 0.0228 0.0000 
D2005 0.1701 0.0255 0.0000 0.1879 0.0243 0.0000 0.1802 0.0249 0.0000 
D2006 0.1563 0.0241 0.0000 0.1719 0.0235 0.0000 0.1679 0.0243 0.0000 
D2007 0.1843 0.0247 0.0000 0.1977 0.0237 0.0000 0.1925 0.0244 0.0000 
D2008 0.1880 0.0231 0.0000 0.2013 0.0226 0.0000 0.1966 0.0237 0.0000 
2(u)          
Constant -1.3586 0.0242 0.0000 -1.1402 0.0834 0.0000 -1.1619 0.0999 0.0000 
Hub -0.7727 0.1302 0.0000 -0.7194 0.1358 0.0000 -0.7433 0.1392 0.0000 
Local 0.4757 0.0546 0.0000 0.5570 0.0289 0.0000 0.4696 0.0553 0.0000 
MAP (Multiple airport) 0.2039 0.0998 0.0410 -0.0934 0.0381 0.0143 -0.1188 0.1578 0.4514 
MAPJO (Jointly operated) 0.0575 0.2134 0.7877 0.1949 0.2045 0.3406 0.2704 0.2365 0.2530 
𝒌 0.1753 0.1039 0.0915 0.2065 0.0682 0.0024 0.1968 0.0497 0.0001 
𝒌𝟐 0.1657 0.1547 0.2842 0.2593 0.0437 0.0000 0.2466 0.0366 0.0000 
𝒕 (Trend) -0.4659 0.0087 0.0000 -0.5380 0.0118 0.0000 -0.5118 0.0116 0.0000 
𝒕𝟐 0.0257 0.0007 0.0000 0.0297 0.0006 0.0000 0.0285 0.0006 0.0000 
2(v)          
Constant -10.2777 0.0242 0.0000 -10.2042 0.0826 0.0000 -10.2930 0.0949 0.0000 
Log-likelihood  1406.9   1404.3   1406.4  
Median Efficiency  87.7   87.7   87.9  
# of Violations  5/649   2/649   2/649  
 
